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In Tense Future (2015), Paul Saint-Amour advances the concept of ‘weak theory’—not only for 
thinking about the expanding field of modernism, but for finding a response to ‘[t]hat exemplary 
strong theory’: total war.1  The idea of ‘weak theory’ has since taken on critical momentum of its 
own, with a Modernism/modernity special issue in 2018 putting a name to an array of approaches 
against symptomatic reading under the umbrella category of ‘weak’, not to mention the spate of 
responses that have since appeared on the Print Plus platform.2  The present cluster brings weak 
theory back to war. It does so not because it wants to winnow down the manifold critical 
possibilities already opened up, but, on the contrary, because the pluralized temporality of 
weakness continues to hold new possibilities for how we read and write about war. ‘Where 
strong theory attempts to ride its sovereign axioms to “a future never for a moment in doubt,”’ 
Saint-Amour writes, ‘weak theory tries to see just a little way ahead, behind, and to the sides, 
conceiving even of its field in partial and provisional terms that will neither impede nor shatter 
the arrival of the unforeseen.’3 Weak theory suggests a temporality of the unformed, the 
voluminous, and the indeterminate. It is that temporal mode which emerges across the essays in 
this special cluster, in which we explore the many ways wartime affects, and is affected by, 
varieties of temporal critique and temporal understanding. 
‘Wartime,’ according to the Oxford English Dictionary, appears to be a clearly defined 
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temporality: ‘wartime (n.) the time when war is being waged.’ Wartime is certainly the time of 
state violence, a time adjudicated by nation states, war cabinets, and generals who declare and 
end wars—a distinct temporality that, for many others, entails trauma, radical precarity, and 
powerlessness. But the actual characteristics of what constitutes ‘war’, and what its waging looks 
like, are often not so clear-cut. Is all time during war, however defined, wartime? Does one need 
direct experience of war violence to experience wartime? How does the idea of time vary from 
war to war? How does the idea of war vary across time? How do differences in location, 
language, religion, ethnicity, culture, and personhood impact how one apprehends and conceives 
of wartime?  
Scholarship on wartime over the past decade has diversified a ‘strong’ theory of war’s 
relationship to time in two prominent ways. First, critics have turned to affect theory for 
rethinking what wartime means and entails, and for advocating for a deeply abstracted, and 
essentially unbounded, definition of wartime. In War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of 
Modern Wartime (2010), Mary Favret treats wartime in the late nineteenth century as a civilian 
consciousness shaped by the presence, and possibility, of often distant war: a now-familiar way, 
for the West at least, of thinking about contemporary rather than historical conflicts. Examining 
the mercurial spatio-temporal effects of war as ‘a persistent mode of daily living’ and a ‘habit of 
mind,’ Favret writes: ‘If we take wartime less as an object of cognition bounded by dates—a 
period—and more as an affecting experience which resonates beyond the here and now, then 
wartime literature becomes an attempt to trace and give shape to such affect, to register its 
wayward power.’4 The point of wartime is its ability to impinge upon both military and civilian 
spheres, it is its spatio-temporal permeability and its meandering force. Wartime literature is not 
necessarily something that claims to have been conceived or published during ‘the time in which 
war is being waged.’ Rather, it describes forms of expression that involve an affective theory of 
                                                      
4
 Mary Favret, War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 14, 11.  
3 
 
wartime as something both ‘strange and familiar, intimate and remote, present and yet not really 
here’: as a temporal condition that is not necessarily durational. 5 It encompasses different tropes, 
feelings, effects, and sensations depending on who one is and where one is situated. 
A second way in which critics have complicated conventional accounts of wartime 
involves a rather different approach, one that seeks to historicize a conflict’s origins, 
manifestations, and legacies within a longer continuum. For example, Jan Mieszkowski’s Watching 
War (2012) has highlighted the ambiguousness of modern war’s temporal boundaries as a result 
of the rise of mobilization in the early twentieth century. With the blurring of military and 
economic realms following the First World War, he argues, war became the grounds for routine 
economic activity. In this way, war ‘could no longer be distinguished from peace by the presence 
(or absence) of violence’, which means there are striking homologies between First World 
wartime and Cold wartime.6 Meanwhile, questions about space and geography have also pointed 
to ways of looking at conflict within longer timescales. This is especially evident in recent studies 
of the First World War; that conflict is increasingly seen as a diversified and historically- and 
culturally-specific event whose temporalities stretch beyond the datelines of 1914-1918. Two 
different books, for instance—Richard S. Grayson’s Dublin’s Great Wars (2018) and Robert 
Gerwarth’s The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923 (2016)—powerfully 
extend the years of the war to account for the demobilisation of troops and for other more 
‘local’ and colonial conflicts, such as the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) or the Turkish 
War of Independence (1919-1923).7 Some critics have embraced a still longer durée, like Kaushik 
Roy in The Army in British India (2013), who discusses nearly a hundred years of Indian wartime—
from the military uprising of the mid-nineteenth century. 8 Most influential, perhaps, is Mary 
Dudziak’s study of modern American wartime, War Time: An Idea, Its Histories, Its Consequences 
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(2012), which analyses, from a legal-political framework, the way conflicts spill past start and end 
dates, to ultimately argue that the United States have been embroiled in continuous military 
interventionism since at least 1898.9  
The state machinery that dictates war and imposes a certain understanding of time; the 
manifold variables in how the temporalities of war are experienced; the way wars relate to one 
another and to other geopolitical developments: these issues, and their tensions and 
intersections, underpin the impulses and multiple directions undertaken by the essays in this 
cluster. These contributors investigate many wartimes across the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, acknowledging how a pluralized understanding of wartime is host to other concerns, 
including scientific philosophies of time, psychoanalysis, imperialism and neo-colonialism, and 
the changing nature of geologic and planetary time. They examine how and why many wars and 
many times co-exist, conflict with, or are nestled within, one another. They speak of wartime in 
ways that contextualize, without conflating, the properties of different wartimes, and the 
temporal effects and affects of different wars. Thus the title for this cluster, ‘Wartime’, is not 
meant to denote a single temporality, the time of war, but a way of reading that decouples those 
two words—war and time—to explode each in turn and to reconsider their dynamic meanings, 




Nevertheless, what distinguishes this cluster from other scholarship cited is a focus on narrative. 
While others have offered redefinitions of wartime, troubling it as an affective and historical 
category, there remains the question of wartime not as one of personal or historical experience, 
but as an aesthetic challenge: wartime as a phenomenon of expression or interpretation. The 
essays in this cluster embrace a wide range of genres and forms, including memorial culture, 
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pamphlets, fiction, poetry, film, and the visual arts, while first-hand accounts of war such as 
diaries, memoirs, and letters—those with seemingly more immediate connections to wartime—
are lacking. Most of the contributions in this cluster also consider literary, theoretical, and artistic 
works by figures who are not direct victims or participants of war violence; they are not the 
people bombed and injured, but (largely Western) writers thousands of miles away from any 
conventionally-understood battlefield. Clearly, there are differences between the temporality of 
war itself and the narrative strategies across different media of investigating such temporalities, 
even when the two intersect. So it is worth pausing here to think more specifically about 
narrative wartime—about the complex relationships between the temporalities of war as 
historical experience, and how they are articulated or represented—to see why narrative is central 
to a heterogeneous understanding of wartime. 
 ‘War,’ Lyndsey Stonebridge writes, ‘both threatens and provokes narrative.’ 10 The 
statement is at once forceful and compelling, yet rich with ambiguity. Why exactly does war both 
threaten and provoke narrative, and what does this paradoxical relationship say about narrative 
itself? Stonebridge goes on: ‘It threatens, as Walter Benjamin pointed out famously, because it 
degrades experience to the extent that narrative communication itself is thrown into crisis; and it 
provokes for precisely the same reason.’11 The essay to which she is referring, Benjamin’s ‘The 
Storyteller’ (1936), observes that ‘men returned from the [First World War] battlefield grown 
silent—not richer, but poorer in communicable experience [Erfahrung].’12 The horrors of the 
front are literally not articulable, so narrative itself has closed up. Benjamin then goes on to 
explain that this condition goes beyond the combatant: ‘never has experience been more 
contradicted more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience 
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by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power.’13 
Benjamin not only claims that wartime disrupts capacities for narrative, but that war’s effects on 
communication are widespread: that wartime ‘experience’ is felt by a whole generation in social, 
political, ethical, and psychological terms, especially in relation to a sharpened awareness of ‘the 
tiny, fragile human body.’14 Throughout his writings, Benjamin uses the terms Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung, both of which are typically translated as ‘experience’. They mean rather different 
things in German, however. The former suggests an idea of experience as the sensations lived or 
witnessed, while the latter suggests a sense of wisdom or understanding drawn from experience 
directed towards the world at large.15 Thus in ‘The Storyteller’, Benjamin is speaking of wartime 
not as an immediately individual experience, but as a deeper, collective condition of being. 
Narrative, then, can register the silences of wartime, which Benjamin understands in an 
expansive and affective sense. For him, the First World War was a culminating event in a long 
historical shift in narrative form—from the dominance of oral storytelling to that of the written 
book—and the novel, he avers, has become the place where ‘the solitary individual, who is no 
longer able to express himself by giving examples of his most important concerns’ can gesture 
towards ‘the incommensurable… in the representation of human life.’16 This is why narrative 
seems able to offer some kind of response to war. For narrative’s temporal incommensurability 
is its strength: a narrative can run backwards and forwards; it can slow or speed up time; it can 
present multiple synchronous temporalities or multiple alternative realities; it can treat history in 
a realist or counterfactual manner; it can do away with history altogether and create a different 
world with different laws and a different logic. Narrative temporality is pliable enough to register 
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a more capacious understanding of wartime. This is evident in the rich and complex body of 
wartime literature which engages in radical narratological experimentation. 
But war, one might say, is intrinsically recalcitrant to narrative, because narrative, as an 
act of representation, gives shape and meaning to time. H. Porter Abbott defines narrative as ‘the 
principal way in which our species organizes its understanding of time’. 17 If this is the case, a similar logic 
would suggest that narrative helps to organize our understanding of wartime—a temporality that, 
as we have seen, fundamentally resists organization and simplification. And if, in Paul Ricoeur’s 
classic statement, ‘Time becomes human time to the extent it is organized after the manner of a 
narrative,’ then narrative itself is a fatal mode for representing war: a phenomenon with meaning 
for those who wage it, perhaps, in the name of a person, a country, or an ideology, but not for 
the tiny, fragile human body that will be injured or obliterated, the body for whom human time 
will be irredeemably altered or destroyed.18 This is why narrative both threatens and provokes 
narrative, simultaneously: it offers a way of representing war, but it also risks eliding the 
fundamental fact of war’s temporal intractability, and its inhumanity.  
One might reasonably ask whether there is a causal connection between the temporality 
of war, and the complex temporal experimentations of war literature (textual or otherwise) being 
examined in this cluster, or whether this is incidental.19 Indeed, in some of these essays, the 
question of wartime is less immediately evident, even obscure. I cannot speak on behalf of the 
contributors, but I will suggest that the difficult ethical-political work of wartime literature lies as 
much with the writer as it does the reader. In fact, almost all of these essays focus less on what 
Kent Puckett calls the narrative problem of wartime, of how to represent it, and more on the 
narrative problem of how to read and interpret wartime. And herein lies a difference between the 
heterogeneity presented by narrative wartime and those presented by the affective and historical 
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understandings of wartime discussed earlier. While narrative offers many ways of articulating the 
temporalities of war, it provides many ways of perceiving and interpreting it as well. This can be 
seen in the extremely diverse approaches taken to thinking about wartime across the cluster. 
Some of the contributors view wartime as a way of understanding contemporary history as a 
narrative of recurring political violence. Others read the concept of wartime narratively in terms 
of metaphor, genre, or style to untangle the perceptual and rhetorical work that war does, when 
it is called as such. For others still, wartime is a way of understanding other parallel or 
overlapping narratives related to neo-colonialism and the Anthropocene. Together, the essays 
corroborate and extend extant scholarship on wartime through critical manoeuvres that reflect 
on the implications of reading wartime as wartime. They scrutinize how acts of reading can by 
turns open up or occlude various intensities of meaning inherent in the coupling of war with 
time. 
Literary studies, of course, is at a moment of conscious self-scrutiny regarding its ability 
to make strong or weak claims, and at a moment of interrogating how contingent and variegated 
its cultures and practices of reading are.20 But there is especial resonance for this kind of self-
reflexivity for understanding wartime, since reading war narratively—being attentive to the 
mechanics and implications of how wartime is both represented and interpreted—involves 
engaging in iterations of temporal understanding that a strong theory, like total war, would claim 
to have absorbed. In ‘Storytime and its Futures’ (2002), Gillian Beer points out that the temporal 
plurality of narrative rests not only with the writer’s experimentation, but with the reader’s 
interpretation. The reader, Beer suggests, has a kind of temporal control over narrative that the 
writer does not; she decides what the time of the reading is, when to pick up or put down a 
book, how fast or slow to engage with it, how to integrate it into the non-literary realm beyond. 
Moreover, even while the reader accepts that a narrative is in theory foreclosed, she reads as 
                                                      




though it isn’t: fiction has a ‘power of generating plural futures in the reader’s mind, against the 
grain of knowing that the text is already written. That temporal paradox is central to the joy and 
grief of the reading experience.’21 This paradox is so powerful that it even survives subsequent 
readings; the reader still ‘cranes forward through the fiction, imagining alternative futures at 
every point’ of a narrative.22 With the cluster’s tremendously varied readings of narrative 
wartime, a unique quality of narrative itself is being exploited and upheld: the ability to engage in 
multiple temporalities and multiple futures, and the ability to explore time’s relationship to war 
as multitudinous and layered, rather than binary and foreclosed.  
The first three essays of this cluster explore the way wartime in the early to mid-twentieth 
century intersects with contemporaneous contexts such as aesthetic modernism, theories and 
philosophies of time, and colonialism. Focusing on the First World War and the two-minute 
commemorative silence, Randall Stevenson discusses how the two minutes could be both ‘short 
and long’ because the subject of remembrance varied from person to person, and how this 
temporal elasticity coincided with parallel interests in modernist interiority and scientific ideas of 
relativity. Where commemoration is, in some ways, about making history possible—it suspends 
daily activity to bring one’s relation to the collective past in focus—Adam Piette’s essay is about 
a kind of non-linear, doubled wartime in which the past sits uneasily with the present. Through 
Freud’s concept of the involute, Piette identifies a way in which mid-century writers invoked 
earlier modernists to express the historical anxieties of ‘past postpropheticals’, to borrow from 
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake—a period when the return of one world war is triggered by the 
expectation, and then arrival, of another.23 Focusing on postcolonial temporalities, Nasser Mufti 
then offers what he calls a ‘proliferated’ understanding of civil wartime with regards to 1940s 
India. Noting that orientalist discourse fashions civil war as durational or geographically and 
temporally bounded, he suggests that wartime for mid-century India is the conjunction between 
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a web of ‘historical sensibilities’ related to communal violence, anti-colonial nationalism and 
futurity, and neo-colonialism.  
The next three essays each take a specific genre—the war film, detective fiction, and the 
epic—to reflect upon the limits and affordances of generic modes of representation. In his essay, 
Kent Puckett points out that Christopher Nolan’s Dunkirk (2017) is in fact a suspense film 
structured around a ticking clock: a countdown towards the moment when the film’s fractured 
storylines in the air, on land, and in the water meet in diegetic time. But the aesthetic beauty and 
narrative virtuosity of Nolan’s film raise questions about how art handles another narrative: what 
Puckett calls ‘the historical or ethical real’ of war. Jane Hu engages in a weak reading of the 
detective fiction genre to show how a complex chronotope of different wartimes emerge. In 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel When We Were Orphans (2000), which is split between London and 
Shanghai in the 1930s, various temporalities—pre-war, interwar, wartime, post-war—come 
together prismatically through modes of readerly ‘detection’ or interpretation. Like Hu, Kate 
McLoughlin looks at the spatial and geographical specificities undergirding any understanding of 
wartime, but she turns to a site of today’s ‘Forever War’, Iraq.24 Although Iraqi war poetry often 
involve allusions to deep, geologic time—a trope central to the epic—there is unique importance 
in this ‘time-trick’ for poets speaking about a place that has borne the brunt of seemingly endless 
invasion and cyclical violence for more than a millennia. 
Finally, Paul Saint-Amour’s afterword chimes with McLoughlin’s essay in examining how 
the earth bears records of wartime, but he also contemplates how wartime itself can alter or 
inscribe itself upon planetary time. He speculates on ‘deep war time’ through a meditation on No 
Man’s Land—which, in the mid-nineteenth century, was the site of the world’s largest 
archaeological dig, and which, today, bequeaths a ‘toxic futurity,’ owing to the munitions 
chemicals and ordnance which have infected its grounds from the First World War. With Saint-
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Amour, we go full circle in the cluster, but with a difference. He ends with the implications of 
deep war time in his immediate present, which happened to be the two-minute silence on the 
centenary of the Armistice; this leads him to observe that minutes appear ‘ill-scaled’ for 
understanding wartime. On the centenary, two minutes seem vastly shorter, and its implications 
vastly longer, than ever before. In the era of the War on Terror, drone warfare, and the 
Anthropocene, the question of what war is when war no longer looks like war—and when 
wartime is short and long, anytime and always—appears to be the question of our times indeed. 
This cluster hopes to make a timely intervention into a timeless, yet always untimely, 
phenomenon. 
